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ARTICLES
The Past and Future of Kentucky's
Fraudulent Transfer and Preference Laws
BY DOUGLAS C. MICHAEL*
INTRODUCTION
important part of the law of creditors' remedies is the abilityA of creditors to recover property formerly held by the debtor,
but transferred to others under circumstances that are consid-
ered to be unfair or inequitable. There are two principal ways a creditor can
seek to have a debtor's transfer characterized as unfair in order to recover
it. First, a transfer to another creditor or a third party can be fraudulent as
to one or all of the remaining creditors, or may be deemed to be fraudulent
* Professor of Law, University of Kentucky. A.B. 1979, Stanford University;
M.B.A. 1982, J.D. 1983, University of California at Berkeley. I am indebted to the
following people who helped guide my research. First, to my colleagues at other
schools who helped with the history and meaning of these otherwise obscure laws,
particularly Jim Bowers, Boyce Covington, Fred Hart, Bruce Markell, and Ray
Warner. Second, to Jerry Hartzell of the North Carolina Bar, who was good enough
to update me on recent developments in that state and provide a copy of the Bar
Association report. Third, to John McCabe at the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, who provided updates and insights on the
uniform law adoption process. Finally, to members of the Kentucky Bar who
provided information on practice experience and their evaluations of the Kentucky
laws, particularly Thomas Canary, Joan Cooper, Susan Hoffman, Jack Reisz,
Robert Treadway, and Tracey Wise. Although this article would not have been
possible without them, they are of course in no way responsible for anything that
is wrong with it.
The footnotes in this Article do not conform to Rule 1.2 of the Sixteenth
Edition of THEBLUEBOOK:AUNIFORM SYSTEM OF CITATION with regard to the use
of see signals, but rather follow the rule that was set out in previous editions.
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because of the circumstances surrounding the transfer, such as a transfer
made by an insolvent debtor for less than fair value. Second, even a transfer
to another creditor for full value can be considered "preferential" to that
creditor. Recovery of a preferential transfer to one creditor, in theory,
makes all of the debtor's property available for an orderly distribution to
all creditors. Fraudulent transfers and preferences are recoverable in state
law collective actions such as assignments for the benefit of creditors, or
in a proceeding under the federal Bankruptcy Code (Code).,
Kentucky has a unique and antique collection of laws governing
fraudulent transfers and preferences. Both the singularity and age of these
laws are easily established with a few examples. The most recent of these
laws were written 140 years ago.2 Kentucky is one of only eight states that
have not adopted one of two uniform laws offered on the subjects in the
past ninety years.3 In addition, Kentucky is one of only three states
allowing creditors to set aside preferences, 4 a power reserved otherwise for
bankruptcy or other insolvency proceedings. Indeed, most other states have
declared their policy to permit preferences, almost as a fundamental right
of debtors to pay any debts they might have at any time, regardless of the
effect on other creditors.
5
This background suggests that Kentucky's singularity is perhaps not a
good thing, but rather evidence of old laws left to languish long past their
time. In Part I of this article, I review the development of modem
fraudulent transfer and preference law. Part II contrasts that development
with the existing law in Kentucky and other non-uniform states. Part ImI
reviews the need and prospects for reform of Kentucky's laws. I conclude
that in most respects improvement and modernization is overdue, but
should proceed carefully with due regard taken of the effect of broadly
written fraudulent transfer statutes on commercial transactions.
I. DEVELOPMENT OF FRAUDULENT TRANSFER
AND PREFERENCE LAW IN THE UNITED STATES
Although the laws of fraudulent transfers and preferences are treated
together in modem legal analyses, they have distinct ancestries. Each will
be discussed here in turn.
i l U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1994).
2See infra note 84 and accompanying text.
'See infra note 115 and accompanying text.
4 See infra notes 36-38 and accompanying text.
5 See infra note 177 and accompanying text.
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A. Fraudulent Transfers
Almost all fraudulent transfer law in the United States claims as its
origin the 1571 Statute of Elizabeth.6 Although this was intended to be
primarily a penal statute, and was originally a temporary law, it was almost
immediately extended by Parliament and interpreted by the courts to allow
creditors to avoid transfers by a debtor made with the intent to defraud
them or to hinder or delay their ability to recover from a debtor.7 In the
United States, almost all states either accepted this rule as part of the
received common law or expressly adopted it by statute.' Because the
courts found early on that actual fraudulent intent was difficult to prove, the
common law relied on more objective indicia of fraud, known as "badges
of fraud," to distinguish culpable transfers from the innocent.9
The addition by courts of badges of fraud, although helpful in
individual cases, had by the early part of this century created so much
confusion that the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws (NCCUSL) noted that "[t]here are few legal subjects where
there is a greater lack of exact definitions and clear understanding of
613 Eliz. c. 5 (1571). The original statute provided in part for the avoidance of:
feigned, covinous and fraudulent Feoffrnents, Gifts, Grants, Alienations,
Conveyances, Bonds, Suits, Judgments and Executions, as well of Lands
and Tenaments as of Goods and Chattels ... [w]hich... have been and are
devised and contrived of Malice, Fraud, Covin, Collusion or Guile, to the
End, Purpose and Intent, to delay, hinder or defraud Creditors and others of
their just and lawful Actions ....
Id. § I. There was an exception for bonafide transfers "upon good Consideration."
Id. § VI.
7 See 1 GARRARD GLENN, FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES AND PREFERENCES 79
(rev. ed. 1940). The Statute of Elizabeth is much more complicated than this simple
text supra note 6 indicates, and has a history at least as fascinating as that of the
law developed since its enactment; see id. at 81-99.
8 Id. at 79-80; Peter A. Alces & Luther M. Dorr, Jr., A CriticalAnalysis of the
New Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, 1985 U. ILL. L. REV. 527, 530. The
exception is Louisiana, whose law is based in the Roman law of revocation, which
is very different in terminology but similar in result. See Bruce V. Schewe, Debtors
in Solido: On Plain Language and Uncertainty with Mention of the Revocatory
Action, 32 LOYOLA L. REV. 13,38-44 (1986); infra note 125 (discussing Louisiana
law).
9 See PETERA. ALCES, THE LAW OF FRAUDULENT TRANSACTIONS, at 5-12,5-32
to -45 (1989); 1 GLENN, supra note 7, at 532-33; Alces & Dorr, supra note 8, at
530-31; Frank R. Kennedy, The Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, 18 UCC L.J.
195, 196 (1986).
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boundaries."10 To remedy this situation, the NCCUSL adopted the Uniform
Fraudulent Conveyance Act (UFCA) in 1918.11 The UFCA improved the
existing common law by providing more objective measures of fraud,
focusing on the effect on creditors of the transfer. 2 Thus, in addition to
transfers made with the always-difficult-to-prove intent to defraud, the
UFCA deemed fraudulent any transfer made by a debtor, without receipt
of fair consideration, if the debtor would be insolvent or have insufficient
assets to pay remaining obligations as they matured. 3
The UFCA was not intended to be a comprehensive treatment of
fraudulent transfer law, 4 but was successful as far as it went, being adopted
by twenty-five states. 5 In addition, it was largely incorporated into federal
bankruptcy law.' 6 When that law was completely rewritten as the Bank-
ruptcy Code in 1978, so too were the provisions governing fraudulent
transfers. In order to update the now-outdated UFCA to reflect this and
other changes, 7 the NCCUSL adopted the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer
Act (UFTA) in 1984.18 The UFTA has had more immediate and near-
universal acceptance, having been adopted in thirty-seven states and the
District of Columbia to date, 19 and five states have retained the UFCA. °
This leaves only eight states (including Kentucky) without a uniform act.
The improvements made by the UFCA, the UFTA, and the Code over
the received English law are well-recognized.2' While the modern laws still
retain the creditor's ability to void a transfer made with actual intent to
defraud, they now permit creditors to recover in other situations as well.
'0 UNIF. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE ACT [hereinafter UFCA], 7A U.L.A. 428
(1985) (Prefatory Note).
" See id. at 427.
12 ALCES, supra note 9, at 5-12; Kennedy, supra note 9, at 197.
3 See generally UFCA §§ 4-6, 7A U.L.A. 474-509 (1985).
14 See 1 GLENN, supra note 7, at 101.
15 See 7A U.L.A. 427 (1985).
16 Id.; ALCES, supra note 9, at 5-13; Kennedy, supra note 9, at 196.
17 See ALCES, supra note 9, at 5-15; Kennedy, supra note 9, at 198-99.
1' 7A U.L.A. 639 (1985).
1 Id. at 217 (Supp. 1997) (listing 36 states and the District of Columbia). North
Carolina became the 37th Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (UFTA) state in 1997.
See 1997 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. Pamphlet No. 4, at 28 (passed July 1, 1997).20 7A U.L.A. 159 (Supp. 1997) (Table).
21 See ALCES, supra note 9, at 5-12; 1 GLENN, supra note 7, at 100; Kennedy,
supra note 9, at 196. See infra Part III.A for a complete discussion of the benefits
and drawbacks of the UFTA.
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These include transfers by debtors who are, or will shortly be, insolvent,22
and certain preferential transfers by "insiders" of the debtor as well.23
Adding these objective measures of "constructive fraud" makes the statutes
more responsive to the modem commercial environment24 by providing
more certainty for lenders, borrowers, and their counsel.
B. Preferences
The history of the law of preferences, judge-made in its early years but
later the subject of much legislation, is well-told by Professor Glenn.25
Today, most states permit recovery in a liquidation proceeding of recent
preferential payments by specific debtors engaged in regulated industries,
primarily insurance companies26 and financial institutions.27 There also are
assorted statutes applying the same rule to liquidations of other business
associations.28 Preferences also are often recoverable under state law if the
debtor later makes a general assignment for the benefit of creditors.29 These
' See supra text accompanying note 13; 11 U.S.C. § 548 (1994).
2 See UFTA § 5(b), 7A U.L.A. 657 (1985); 11 U.S.C. §§ 547, 550(c) (1985).
4 This was one of the major objectives of the UFCA. See Alces & Dorr, supra
note 8, at 533.
2 See 2 GLENN, supra note 7, at 646-80.
26 Statutes permitting recovery of preferences during a period (usually four
months) before receivership or liquidation of an insurance company exist in almost
all states. See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304.33-3 10 (Michie 1996); CAL. INS.
CODE § 1034 (1993); IND. CODE § 27-9-3-16 (1994); N.Y. INS. LAW § 7425
(McKinney 1985); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3903.28 (Anderson 1996); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 56-9-317 (1994); TEX. INS. CODE ANN. § 21.28(5)(a) (West 1981);
VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-1513 (Michie 1994); W.VA. CODE §§ 33-10.26, 33-24.33
(1996); see also REFERENCE HANDBOOK ON INSURANCE COMPANY INSOLVENCY
27-28 (Cynthia J. Borrelli ed., 3d ed. 1993) (providing § 28 of the National Ass'n
of Insurance Commissioners' Insurers Supervision, Rehabilitation and Liquidation
Model Act).
27 As to national banks, see 12 U.S.C. § 91 (1994); as to state financial
institutions, see 3 MICHIE ON BANKS AND BANKING 224-27 (1996) and 1 MILTON
R. SCHROEDER, THE LAW AND REGULATION OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 12-76
(1995).
2 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 440.386 (West 1991) (workers' compensation
for self-insured employers); GA. CODE ANN. § 14-9A-129 (1994) (limited
partnerships); IOWA CODE §§ 523A.22, 5231.5 (West 1988) (funeral homes and
cemeteries); WASH. REV. CODE § 23.72.020 (1994) (corporations).
2 9 STEFANA. RIESENFELD, CREDITORS' REMEDIES AND DEBTORS' PROTECTION
431 (4th ed. 1987) ("[M]any states [have] enacted statutes proscribing preferences
1997-98]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
statutes, though they are applied in diverse situations, have in common the
avoidance of preferences given just before an insolvency or liquidation.
Such payments are more likely to be unfair than an "ordinary course"
preference since the debtor is in financial trouble and it is more likely that
one creditor will be fully paid while others of an identical priority will
remain unpaid. The development of such a rule seems sensible, though it
was long in coming to English law.3 It parallels, of course, the similar
provision in the Code permitting avoidance of preferences by trustees."
There is in addition the federal priority statute which is not a preference
law, but rather gives claims of the federal government first priority in
certain cases involving transfers by insolvents.3 2 A companion provision
permits recovery from a debtor's representative of a preferential pay-
ment by that representative. These provisions, like the statutes discussed
above, focus on collective proceedings, implicitly in the case of the priority
rule34 and explicitly in the case of recovery from a debtor's representa-
tive.
5
The avoidance at state law of a preferential payment outside of these
relatively limited circumstances is permitted only in three states: Ken-
in the form of, or in conjunction with.... [general] assignments .... "). In addition,
at least two states convert a partial assignment for the benefit of creditors into a
general assignment. See OKLA. STAT. ANN., tit. 24, § 31 (West 1987); 39 PA. STAT.
ANN. § 2 (West 1954); RIESENFELD, supra, at 441.
30 2 GLENN, supra note 7, at 654.
31 See 11 U.S.C. § 547 (1994).
12 See 31 U.S.C. § 3713(a) (1994) (providing for first priority of a federal claim
if a person is insolvent and assigns property or has property attached, or if a
decedent's estate is insufficient to pay all claims). The statute also gives the federal
claim priority if an "act of bankruptcy" is committed, a concept no longer part of
bankruptcy law, but nonetheless "a vital part of the Insolvency Statute." Carter v.
Carter, 681 F. Supp. 323, 326 (E.D. Va. 1988).
1131 U.S.C. § 3713(b) (making the representative liable to the extent any other
claim is paid before the federal claim).
34 See William T. Plumb, Jr., The Federal Priority in Insolvency: Proposals for
Reform, 70 MICH. L. REV. 1, 14 (1971) ("[A] statutory rule of priority that creates
no lien but simply provides the order of distribution of the debtor's assets is
appropriately applicable only in collective proceedings involving administration
of all or substantially all of a debtor's assets .... ).
" The person referred to in § 3713(b) is one "into whose hands control and
possession of the debtor's assets are placed [and who is] responsible for seeing that
the Government's priority is paid." King v. United States, 379 U.S. 329, 337
(1964).
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tucky,36 New Mexico,37 and Ohio.38 Other writers have mentioned
Maryland39 and Pennsylvania4° statutes in this context, but both of those
states' statutes can be distinguished from the inquiry at hand. The
Maryland statute appears to apply by its terms only to a state law assign-
ment or receivership, and is thus not a general anti-preference statute, but
rather the kind of statute discussed above.4 The same is true with one of
the Pennsylvania statutes.42 The other Pennsylvania statute provides in
relevant part that "a debtor may assign any part of his estate to certain
creditors, or in trust for them, if at the time of so doing he be solvent, or the
same be not in contravention of the other provisions of this act."43 Although
this language appears general in nature, Pennsylvania courts have never
interpreted the emphasized portion of this statute to be a general anti-
preference statute. On the contrary, preferences even by insolvents have
been upheld." North Dakota and South Dakota criminalize preferential
payments by insolvent debtors, but say nothing more.45
36 See KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 378.060 (Michie 1972).
37 See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 56-9-4 (Michie 1996).
38 See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1313.56 (Anderson 1993).
39 See Thomas D. Buckley, The Use of Ohio's Preference Law in Bankruptcy:
An Alternative to Section 547 With a Longer "'Reach-Back" Period, 20 CAP. U. L.
REV. 863, 863 & n.1 (1991) (citing MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 15-101(d)
(1990)).
40 See RIESENFELD, supra note 29, at 441 (citing 39 PA. STAT. ANN. § 2 (West
1954)); William S. Tribell, Comment, The Effect of the National Bankruptcy Act
on Kentucky's General Assignment Law, 41 KY. L.J. 450, 453 & n.15 (1952-53)
(citing 39 PA. STAT. ANN. § 152 (West 1954)).
41 See supra note 28.
42 See 39 PA. STAT. ANN. § 152 (West 1954) (providing for avoidance of
preferences given within four months of a general assignment for the benefit of
creditors).
43 Id. § 2 (emphasis supplied).
"See, e.g., Rorison v. Davey, 49 A.2d 357, 359-60 (Pa. 1946); Schimmel v.
Cohen, 118 A. 735 (Pa. 1922) ("[A] man may prefer one creditor over another if
he sees fit to do so, and the mere fact of such preference will not invalidate the
transaction in the absence of an allegation and proof of fraud."); Commonwealth
Nat'l Bank v. Miller, 437 A.2d 1012, 1014 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1981) ("This state has
long held that there is no fraud involved in the preference of one creditor over
another, even if the preferred creditor and debtor agree in the full knowledge that
other creditors will be left unpaid.").
4- See N.D. CENT. CODE § 13-01-13 (1991); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 54-8-21
(Michie 1996).
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In these three states - Kentucky, Ohio, and New Mexico - a transfer
made with a "design to prefer" one creditor is avoidable.46 This language
of intent was originally meant to distinguish payments to creditors made
under pressure or threat, which presumably bore no such intent, from those
payments made voluntarily, which first became voidable outside of
bankruptcy by common law decisions traced back to 1758. 47 It appears,
therefore, that a transfer made with a "design to prefer" is roughly what the
courts that coined the phrase would call a transfer made "for no other good
reason."48 This history has long been forgotten, however, and it would be
completely irrelevant but for the fact that "phrases like 'intent to prefer'
crop up here and there in our statutes, and would be confusing did we not
know that, like a vermiform appendix, this terminology shows that there
was once a thing which meant a good deal.' 4 9 However, because this
appendix remains viable in Kentucky, we must deal with the confusion that
results when courts try to breathe common-law life into statutory language
with little modem importance. 0
There is a different history of the preference within, as opposed to
outside, a bankruptcy or insolvency proceeding. The history of the
preference in bankruptcy is also well-told by Professors Glen s' and
Countryman. 2 It began as ajudge-made rule intended to address "'a fraud
upon the bankrupt laws."' 53 Eventually, however, the avoidable preference
became virtually a "no-fault" phenomenon, devoid, at least in the current
Code language, of any requirement of proof of intent by the debtor or
knowledge of any intent by the creditor. 4 This evolutionary history is
important, however, because it shows that during the mid-nineteenth
century, when the state preference laws were being enacted, the preference
was like a fraudulent transfer, though not at once the same. It seems that
the confusion of that time was incorporated into state laws of the day, and
46 See supra notes 36-38.
47 2 GLENN, supra note 7, at 654 & n.22 (citing cases).
48 My own language.
49 2 GLENN, supra note 7, at 656.
so See infra Part ll.A.2.
5' See 2 GLENN, supra note 7, at 681-732.
52See Vern Countryman, The Concept ofa Voidable Preference in Bankruptcy,
38 VAND. L. REv. 713 (1985).
53 2 GLENN, supra note 7, at 656 (quoting Lord Mansfield in Worseley v.
DeMattoos, 1 Burr. 467 (1758)).
14 This entire development is well-documented in Countryman, supra note 52,
at 718-32.
5
1 See 2 GLENN, supra note 7, at 656-57; Countryman, supra note 52, at 718-21.
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notwithstanding the Code's modernization, has been there frozen in place
in these three states retaining these ancient laws.
II. DEVELOPMENT OF NON-UNIFORM
FRAUDULENT TRANSFER AND PREFERENCE LAW
This Part describes, against the background of the general history of
development of these laws discussed in Part I, the specific development of
Kentucky law and surveys briefly the status of these laws in the other seven
non-uniform states.
A. Kentucky
1. Fraudulent Transfers
In 1796, Kentucky passed a statute copied largely from the Statute of
Elizabeth, declaring void every transfer "contrived of malice, fraud, covin,
collusion or guile to the intent or purpose to delay, hinder or defraud
creditors oftheirjust and lawful actions. 56 This language was substantially
modified in 1851,11 and an important provision was added permitting
avoidance of gifts by debtors."8 In 1896, a new section was added dispens-
ing with the requirement of an unsatisfied execution in actions to set aside
conveyances of real property.s9 The language remains otherwise unchanged
56 1796 Ky. Acts, c. 255, § 2 (1809). This language obviously is copied from
the Statute of Elizabeth. Cf supra note 6. Like that statute, there is an exception for
bonafide transfers upon good consideration. See 1796 Ky. Acts, c. 255, § 3. This
Act also covered other transfers. It avoided gratuitous transfers of property unless
accompanied by a transfer ofpossession. And in cases of loans ofpersonal property
for more than five years without demand for return and transfers of personal
property with any reservation, the act provided that, as against creditors, "the
absolute property is with the possession." Id. § 2.
57 See 1850 Ky. Acts, c. 617, c. 26 §§ 1-4 (1851). This Act also made heirs and
devisees liable for debts of the testator. See id. §§ 5-10.
" "Every gift, conveyance, assignment, transfer, or charge made by a debtor,
of or upon any of his estate, without valuable consideration therefor, shall be void
..... Id. § 2. Fraudulent transfers could be avoided by all "creditors, purchasers,
or other persons," id. § 1, but transfers by debtors without consideration could be
avoided only by present creditors, id. § 2. These are, of course, the ancestors of KY.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 378.010 and 378.020 (Michie 1972); see infra note 59.
59 See 1896 Ky. Acts, c. 7 (1896) (codified at KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 378.030).
One writer has suggested that only a judgment need be required in any case
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today.60 Thus, although the statutory law of fraudulent transfers provides
several avenues of recovery for creditors, the most significant and most
frequently used are the two permitting avoidance of: (1) transfers made
with intent to defraud 6' and (2) gifts by debtors. 62 Judicial developments
under each are discussed in turn below.
a. Transfers with Intent to Defraud
After the passage of the Statute of Elizabeth, English courts struggled
to separate fraudulent transfers from the innocent, developing "badges of
fraud" as guideposts.63 Kentucky courts have done the same with our
version of the statute. Facts or actions of the debtor labeled as badges of
fraud include transfers to relatives, false statements regarding consider-
ation, transfers after or in anticipation of litigation against the transferor,
transfer of all or most of the transferor's assets, and the insolvency of the
(involving real or personal property). See Arloe W. Mayne, Comment, Creditors'
Bills andActions to Set Aside Fraudulent Conveyances - Prerequisites to Suit, 39
KY. L.J. 103 (1950-51). No requirement of prior execution was included in the
UFCA.
60 A typographical change was made in 1852. See 1851 Ky. Acts, c. 358, c. 59
(1852). The entire provision was reenacted in 1892. See 1891-1893 Ky. Acts, c.
119, §§ 1-4 (1892). As amended in 1896, see supra note 58, these provisions
became §§ 1906-1909 of Carroll's Kentucky Statutes and thence KY. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 378.010-.050. See KY. REv. STAT. (1944) (Disposition Table).
61 See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 378.010 (Michie 1972), which provides that:
Every gift, conveyance, assignment or transfer of, or charge upon, any
estate, real or personal, or right or thing in action, or any rent or profit
thereof, made with the intent to delay, hinder or defraud creditors,
purchasers or other persons, and every bond or other evidence of debt
given, action commenced or judgment suffered, with like intent, shall be
void as against such creditors, purchasers and other persons. This section
shall not affect the title of a purchaser for a valuable consideration, unless
it appears that he had notice of the fraudulent intent of his immediate
grantor or of the fraud rendering void the title of such grantor.
62 See id. § 378.020, which provides that:
Every gift, conveyance, assignment, transfer or charge made by a debtor,
or of upon any of his estate without valuable consideration therefor, shall
be void as to all his then existing creditors, but shall not, on that account
alone, be void as to creditors whose claims are thereafter contracted, nor as
to purchasers from the debtor with notice of the voluntary alienation or
charge.63See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
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transferor.64 It is well-settled that the effect of the plaintiffs proof of one
or more of these badges of fraud is to shift to the defendant the burden of
proving lack of fraudulent intent.65 Other factors akin to badges of fraud are
listed in the statute elsewhere.
66
Once such a conveyance is proved, the statute provides that it "shall be
void," but not as against "a purchaser for a valuable consideration, unless
it appears that he had notice of the fraudulent intent of his immediate
grantor or of the fraud rendering void the title of such grantor. '67 Kentucky
courts have made various interpretations of this requirement for creditors
attempting to pursue the transferee of the debtor's property. "Valuable
consideration" under the statute may be found unless the value and the
consideration are "disproportionate. 68 If such disparity is absent, courts
move to the more difficult second element of "notice" of the fraud. Some
courts have said that notice by the transferee can be established by the same
proof that shows the transaction was fraudulent to the creditor.6 9 In Trent
v. Carroll,70 the court established that lack of notice under the statute is
similar to a finding of good faith on the part of the transferee, which
4 See Russell Co. Feed Mill, Inc. v. Kimbler, 520 S.W.2d 309,311 (Ky. 1975);
Trent v. Carroll, 380 S.W.2d 87, 89 (Ky. 1964); Magic City Coal & Feed Co. v.
Lewis, 175 S.W. 992, 993-94 (Ky. 1915). "Insolvency" when used as a badge of
fraud is not well-defined by the courts, but is presumably a "balance sheet" test.
See, e.g., Russell Co. FeedMill, 520 S.W.2d at 312 (debtor had no assets); Hayes
v. Rodgers, 447 S.W.2d 597, 600 (Ky. 1969) (creditors' remedies hadbeen pursued
without success); Hardy v. Peoples State Bank & Trust Co., 229 S.W.2d 771, 772
(Ky. 1950) (listing other indebtedness of debtor).
6s See Magic City, 175 S.W. at 993. Even in 1915, the court was able to cite six
cases on this point. See also Russell Co. Feed Mill, 520 S.W.2d at 312 (finding it
error to grant defendant's motion for a directed verdict where plaintiff had proved
badges of fraud and defendant did not respond); Hayes, 447 S.W.2d at 600
(describing the burden on the defendant as one of "proving good faith"); Farmers'
Bank & Trust Co. v. Peters, 11 S.W.2d 103, 104-05 (Ky. 1928) (holding that
defendant's proof of valuable past consideration for transfer satisfied the burden
of proof that was shifted to it by plaintiff's proof of badges of fraud).
66 See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 378.020 (Michie 1972) (gifts by debtors, dis-
cussed infra Part l.A. 1.b); id. § 378.040 (conveyance ofpersonal property without
delivery); id. § 378.050 (loan of personal property for five years without demand
for return).671d. § 378.010.
68McKenzie v. Oliver, 571 S.W.2d 102, 107 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978).
69 See, e.g., Harlin v. Calvert's Adm'x, 70 S.W.2d 524 (Ky. 1934).
70Trent v. Carroll, 380 S.W.2d 87 (Ky. 1964).
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depends "upon the sufficiency and reasonableness of his inquiry."'" A few
months later, however, the court decided in Interstate Acceptance Corp. v.
Lovins7' that the purchaser there was not put on inquiry notice by the
circumstances of the transaction, and the court intimated that it is unlikely
that such a duty could ever be found.73 The court stated broadly that "the
buyer is not the guardian of the seller's creditors,"74 a statement that
diminishes significantly any duty on the part of transferees and shows, in
opposition to the language of the statute, "a tension that runs throughout the
law of fraudulent dispositions."75
b. Gifs by Debtors
One badge of fraud so singular as to warrant separate treatment is lack
of consideration received by a transferor. Although not mentioned in the
Statute of Elizabeth,76the idea of attacking gratuitous transfers quicklytook
root in this country.7 7 Indeed, the first Kentucky statute on the subject
71 Id. at 90.
72 Interstate Acceptance Corp. v. Lovins, 380 S.W.2d 805 (Ky. 1964).
73 Regarding this duty of inquiry, the court noted:
Inquiry about what? That the [debtors] had creditors? Any going business
has creditors. . . . Inquiry about the amount of indebtedness to [the
creditor]? . . .Had such inquiry been made it would have disclosed a
sharply fluctuating creditor-debtor relationship which had apparently been
satisfactory to [the creditor] over a long period of years. Inquiry about the
intentions of [the debtors] with respect to their plans to liquidate their
obligations? We know of no rule of law or reason to require such a course
of action and obviously a debtor would not disclose anything inimical to his
interests.
Id. at 808. Although Trent was decided before Lovins, the Trent opinion was
modified on denial of rehearing two weeks after Lovins was decided, with no
mention of it. Trent probably can be distinguished on its facts, however, as the
court noted there that the transferee's testimony "indicates strongly that he thought
he could color the transaction with good faith by a title search and by reliance on
[the debtor], who was tainted with fraud." Trent, 380 S.W.2d at90. It appears, then,
that the transferee in Trent had actually made an inquiry and terminated it
prematurely when it began producing uncomfortable evidence.
74Lovins, 380 S.W.2d at 808.
75ALCES, supra note 9, at 5-35 (discussing Lovins).
76 See id. at 5-33; 1 GLENN, supra note 7, at 455.
77 See 1 GLENN, supra note 7, at 456-57.
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permitted avoidance of gratuitous transfers without limitation," and
although there was a split in the law in the early nineteenth century, the
view prevailed that lack of consideration was alone not a ground for attack
unless the transferor was also insolvent.7 9 Otherwise, it would be possible
"in theory, at least, [that] the Christmas presents of every indebted person
[would be] ... subject to attack by creditors regardless of any circum-
stances tending to show good faith and due regard for the interest of
creditors when the gifts were made."80
Nonetheless, the minority view remained the law in Kentucky. Early
in the Commonwealth's history, the courts made clear that the statute
required no proof of anything other than lack of consideration." Although
"[i]fcarriedto its ultimate consequences eventhe most trivial indebtedness
would be sufficient to avoid the voluntary conveyance,"82 the statute and
the rule remain unchanged today. Indeed, a prefatory note to the UFCA in
1918 referred to the "sharp conflict" on the issue of an insolvency
requirement, noting that Kentucky was one jurisdiction "which adhere[s]
to an early rule of great severity.
83
2. Preferences
Kentucky's preference law is of comparatively recent origin, dating
from 1856.84 It makes any transfer by a debtor "in contemplation of
insolvency and with the design to prefer one or more creditors to the
exclusion in whole or in part of others" operate as an assignment for the
benefit of all creditors. 5 The statute remains, with minor changes, as it was
written on enactment.
8 6
78 See supra note 58.
79See 1 GLENN, supra note 7, at 458-60.80James Angell McLaughlin, Application of the Uniform Fraudulent Convey-
ance Act, 46 HARV. L. REV. 404, 407-08 (1932-33).
s James M. Marks, Comment, Kentucky's Obsolete Law on Girs by Debtors,
39 Ky. L.J. 456,456-57 (1950-51).
82 Id. at 457.
83 7A U.L.A. 428 (1985) (Prefatory Note to the UFCA).
14 See 1855 Ky. Acts, ch. 704 (1856).
851 d. § 1 (codified at KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 378.060 (Michie 1972)).
16 The 1892 recodification, see supra note 60, added "everyjudgment suffered"
to the list of potentially preferential transfers, and provided new priorities for
distribution of the assets of the estate. See 1891-1893 Ky. Acts, ch. 119, §§ 5, 11
(1892). These provisions became sections 1910-1917 of Carroll's Kentucky
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Judicial interpretation of this statute has attempted to operate between
two extremes. On the one hand, surely all payments to creditors do not
work an assignment for the benefit of all creditors. On the other hand, a
payment made "with the design to prefer" the creditor ought not be
synonymous with fraud, otherwise the statute simply duplicates the
fraudulent transfer law.
The fact of the debtor's insolvency87 is often held to raise the presump-
tion of a design to prefer,8 8 and occasionally the presumption is absolute.8 9
The debtor's insolvency is proved even if it is the debtor's fervent hope that
solvency exists' or is imminent.91 Some hint of what "the design to prefer"
might be comes from a case holding an inter-family transfer to have such
a design.92 In another, the court holds that the debtor's intention to avoid
bankruptcy is insufficient to rebut the above presumption, 93 but goes on to
state in dictum what might be a transfer without design, noting that "[t]his
is not a case of a struggling debtor, who uses a portion of his property to
discharge pressing debts, in the honest belief that he might continue in
business, and thereafter was forced into insolvency."94 Or, as another case
stated in dictum: "Of course a debtor cannot prefer one creditor over
another, but if his conveyances are made in good faith, for a valuable
Statutes and thence KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 378.060-.090. See KY. REV. STAT.
(1944) (Disposition Table).
87 Insolvency here, as in the case of the fraudulent transfer statute, see supra
note 64, is determined by a "balance sheet" test, so far as the cases make clear. See
Frankfort Builders Supply Co. v. Pollard, 305 S.W.2d 110, 112 (Ky. 1957); Terrell
v. Cheatham, 255 S.W. 262,263-64 (Ky. 1923).
88 See Bomanzi of Lexington, Inc. v. Tafel, 415 S.W.2d 627, 630 (Ky. 1967);
Greathouse v. Millard, 320 S.W.2d 630, 632 (Ky. 1958) ("designed to prefer");
Finan v. Finan's Trustee, 57 S.W.2d 644, 645 (Ky. 1933); Union Trust & Savings
Co. of Maysville v. Taylor, 134 S.W. 196, 197 (Ky. 1911).
89 See McKinney Deposit Bank v. Cyrus W. Scott Mfg. Co., 269 S.W. 343,344
(Ky. 1924).
90 See Terrell, 255 S.W. at 263-64 (debtor's belief in value of assets held not
reasonable in light of demands of security by other creditors).
"' See Goodloe v. Buckner, 32 S.W. 135, 136 (Ky. 1895) ("The expectations of
[debtor], although honest and sincere, cannot avail [him] in this case.").
92 See Rains' Trustee v. Rains, 3 S.W.2d 1065, 1066 (Ky. 1928).
93 See Finan, 57 S.W.2d at 645.
94 Id.
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consideration, and without design to hinder or delay his creditors, the
transfer will not be disturbed."95
As the last quote demonstrates by mixing in the language of the
fraudulent transfer law, there remains in Kentucky courts significant
confusion over the status of the preference as a separate, non-fraudulent
conveyance. Many opinions have lumped both together as "fraud"
statutes,96 while others maintained that the preference statute has nothing
to with fraud.97 It is important in this context to recall that the initial
purpose of the "intent" or "design" to prefer was to separate transfers made
with no other reason from those made under duress or threat of retribution
in some fashion other than that provided by the law of creditors' remedies.
For example, a transfer coerced by a creditor who has threatened to sue or
foreclose would not have such an intent or design, but presumably a
transfer coerced by a creditor who threatened other harm would have such
an intent or design.98
Kentucky courts have fashioned exceptions to the statute, analogous to
the more familiar exceptions in the Code. If the transfer occurs at the same
time as the value is given by the creditor to the debtor, no preference will
be found.99 Preferential transfers to otherwise fully secured creditors have
9' Hickman Bank & Trust Co. v. Pickard & Mayberry, 270 S.W. 30, 32 (Ky.
1925).
96 See Greathouse v. Millard, 320 S.W.2d 630, 632 (Ky. 1958) (using "badges
of fraud" as evidence supporting intent to prefer); Kincaid v. Brown's Estate, 262
S.W.2d 468,473 (Ky. 1953) (discussing both the fraudulent transfer and preference
statutes and noting that it is "not the nature or form of the transaction, but the
presence of fraud which brings a case within the terms of the statutes"); S.J. Marx
Co.'s Trustee v. Marx, 3 S.W.2d 644, 646 (Ky. 1928).
97See Lyon v. Harris, 121 S.W.2d 696, 697 (Ky. 1938) (holding that a transfer
not proven to be fraudulent would nonetheless be actionable as a preference, but
the preference statute was not pled); Farmers' Bank of Fountain Run v. Hagan, 46
S.W.2d 1084, 1087 (Ky. 1932); Hord v. Green, 44 S.W.2d 549, 551 (Ky. 1931)
(stating that "[t]hese provisions are to be read together," and then proceeding to
show the differences between them); Farmers' Bank & Trust Co. v. Peters, 11
S.W.2d 103, 105 (Ky. 1928) (same conclusion as in Lyon, 121 S.W.2d at 696).
98 See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
99 See Frankfort Builders Supply Co. v. Pollard, 305 S.W.2d 110, 111 (Ky.
1957); Linn v. Brown, 206 S.W. 287,289 (Ky. 1918); see also Reed v. Shirley, 271
S.W. 73, 74 (Ky. 1925) (holding a preference actionable because it was made by
an insolvent and not on account of a "debt or liability created simultaneously with
it"). Cf. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(2) & (c)(1) (1994).
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been held not actionable.100 And preferential transfers of exempt property
are not actionable under the Kentucky statute.'
If a preference has been found and no exceptions are made, the statute
provides that the preferential transfer shall operate as an assignment for the
benefit of all creditors, in which all creditors may participate, and which
shall be administered according to the rules governing decedents' estates.0 2
This language persists despite the later enactment of a comprehensive
general assignment statute. 3 Even though the statute mentions no other
relief, recovery of money has been allowed."°
3. Effect of These Statutes Under the Bankruptcy Code
Both the Kentucky fraudulent transfer and anti-preference statutes are
available to the trustee in bankruptcy according to Code § 544(b). Both
statutes have potential for greater recovery for the estate, since they have
longer "reach-back" periods than their federal counterparts. The Code's
fraudulent transfer provision reaches back only one year,0 5 but courts have
held that the Kentucky statute has a five-year statute of limitations, with the
period beginning only on discovery of the fraud.0 6 The Code's preference
"oSee Jackson v. Coons, 147 S.W.2d 45, 47 (Ky. 1941); Young v. Fidelity &
Columbia Trust Co., 79 S.W.2d 944, 947 (Ky. 1935); see also Greathouse v.
Millard, 320 S.W.2d 630, 632 (Ky. 1958) (holding that transfers were preferential
because the creditor was no longer secured when the transfers were made); Terrell
v. Cheatham, 255 S.W. 262, 264 (Ky. 1923) (dictum). Cf. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(5)
(1994) (providing that to be actionable, a transfer must, if recovered, allow a
creditor to receive more in liquidation than would have been received otherwise;
this requirement is normally not met in the case of transfers to previously fully
secured creditors).
'0 SeeKesslerv. Tapp, 180 S.W.2d 552,554 (Ky. 1944); Tewmey v. Tewmey's
Assignee, 65 S.W.2d 479, 480 (Ky. 1933) (citing cases). Cf. 5 COLLIER ON
BANKRUPTCY 547-21 (rev. 15th ed. 1997) (same result under the Bankruptcy
Code).
'02 See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 378.060-.070 (Michie 1972).
'03 See id. §§ 379.010-.170 (Michie 1972 & Supp. 1996) (discussed infra notes
179-83 and accompanying text).
'o See Bomanzi of Lexington, Inc. v. Tafel, 415 S.W.2d 627, 631 (Ky. 1967).
'0s See 11 U.S.C. § 548(a) (1994).
6 See Pergrem v. Smith, 255 S.W.2d 42, 43-44 (Ky. 1953); Gillardi v. Henry,
113 S.W. 2d 1158, 1162 (Ky. 1938); Moore v. Shepherd, 225 S.W. 484,486 (Ky.
1920). The limitation period is provided by KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 413.120(11)
(Michie 1992) (establishing five-year limitation for actions based on fraud); id.
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"reach-back" period is three months,' 7 while the Kentucky anti-preference
statute provides a six-month period.0 8 In bankruptcy, however, this
limitation is replaced by Code § 546(a), which allows more time once the
bankruptcy petition is filed.0 9 Court decisions have made clear that there
is no preemption problem here; the state statute supplements rather than
contradicts the federal provisions."10
The Kentucky anti-preference statute, so far as sparse cases have
indicated, may provide a unique opportunity for a trustee to have the best
of all worlds in a bankruptcy proceeding. An initial literal reading of the
statutes together would suggest that the trustee obtains, under Code
§ 544(b), the right of an actual creditor under state law - that is, to
participate in a general assignment for the benefit of all creditors,"' hardly
a valuable right once in bankruptcy. Thus, at least one court has held, and
most others have assumed, that the right under Code § 544(b) includes the
§ 413.130(3) (providing that cause of action does not accrue until discovery of
fraud, but may not in any event be brought more than 10 years after the
perpetration of the fraud).
'07 See 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(4) (1994) (providing that a transfer to be avoided
must be made on or within 90 days of filing the petition for relief, or within one
year in the case of transfers to insider-creditors).
'os See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 378.070(1) (Michie 1972).
o9See In re Wilson, 106 B.R. 125, 126 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1989); In re Scott-
Frederick Motor Co., 177 F. Supp. 758, 760 (E.D. Ky. 1959). The Code provides
that an action under § 544(b) must be brought within two years after the entry of
the order for relief, or one year after the appointment of a trustee (if any),
whichever is later, but in any event no later than the time the case is closed or
dismissed. See 11 U.S.C. § 546(a) (1994). The court in In re Baird, 63 B.R. 60, 63
(Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1986), held that 11 U.S.C. § 108(c) would apply, but that section
refers only to actions against the debtor, which is never the case in an action to set
aside a fraudulent transfer or preference. See In re Wilson, 106 B.R. at 126.
1' See RIESENFELD, supra note 29, at 435 & n.44 (citing Stellwagen v. Clum,
245 U.S. 605 (1918)). Stellwagen upheld the predecessorto OHIOREV. CODEANN.
§ 1313.56 (Anderson 1993), which is nearly identical to the Kentucky statute. See
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 378.060; see also In re Rexplore Drilling, Inc., 971 F.2d
1219, 1222 (6th Cir. 1992). But see id. at 1225-26 (Merritt, C.J., dissenting)
(arguing that there is a preemption problem because "the time limits and the
substance of the Kentucky preference statute are flatly inconsistent with the
preference provisions of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 547."). Neither the
Rexplore opinion nor the dissent discusses Stellwagen.
"'. See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 378.060 (providing that the preferential payment
"shall operate as an assignment and transfer of all the property of the debtor, and
shall inure to the benefit of all his creditors").
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right to avoid the transfer. ' 12 In another expansive reading of the remedy
provided in the combination of these two statutes, a court has held that the
trustee need not find an actual creditor in existence at the time of the
preferential payment, as Code § 544(b) otherwise requires," 3 because the
trustee became such a creditor by operation of state law as soon as the
preference was given. 114
B. Other Non-Uniform States
1. Fraudulent Transfers
The states remaining outside the uniform fold (in addition to Kentucky)
are Alaska, Georgia, Kansas, Louisiana, Mississippi, South Carolina, and
Virginia."5 If there is uniformity in this assortment, it is in the presence in
six of these states of Statute-of-Elizabeth-type laws declaring fraudulent
transfers void,"6 each excepting transfers made to bona fide purchasers
112 See Kessler v. Tapp, 180 S.W.2d 552, 553-54 (Ky. 1944) (involving an
action under the National Bankruptcy Act § 110(e), the predecessor to 11 U.S.C.
§ 544(b)). Under this law, the court would later hold in another case that a creditor
proving a voidable preference may have that creditor's pro rata share in a money
judgment. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
"3 See 11 U.S.C. § 544(b) (permitting the trustee to avoid any transfer "that is
voidable under applicable law by a creditor holding an unsecured claim")
(emphasis supplied).
14 See In re Scott-Frederick Motor Co., 177 F. Supp. 758,760 (E.D. Ky. 1959);
see also KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 378.060 (providing that the preference operates as
an assignment for the benefit of all creditors "including those which are future and
contingent").
".. See 7A U.L.A. 427 (1985) & 217 (Supp. 1997) (tables of adoptions of
UFCA and UFTA). North Carolina recently left this list. See supra note 19. The
alert reader can see a geographical trend here. Southeastern states generally are
perceived by some as slower to adoptuniform laws. Telephone Interview with John
McCabe, Legislative Coordinator, National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws ("NCCUSL") (Aug. 15, 1997).
116 See ALASKA STAT. § 34.40.010 (Michie 1986); GA. CODEANN. § 18-2-22(2)
(1991); KAN. STAT.ANN. § 33-102 (1993); MISS. CODE ANN. § 15-3-3 (1995); S.C.
CODE ANN. § 27-23-10 (Law. Co-op. 1991); VA. CODE ANN. § 55-80 (Michie
1995). The South Carolina statute even retains the Statute of Elizabeth's penal
provisions, imposing a penalty of loss of one year's value, half to be paid to the
state. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 27-23-30 (Law. Co-op. 1991). In Louisiana, a transfer
that increases a debtor's insolvency can be avoided without regard to fraud. See LA.
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without notice of the fraud."' There is more limited consensus, in four
states, avoiding conveyances by an insolvent debtor."' A few of these
states have provisions similar to Kentucky's avoiding an unrecorded
conveyance of personal property without change of possession 19 and loans
of property without demand for return by the lender within a certain period
of time. 20
Many of the same problems evident in Kentucky's experience with old
statutory provisions have surfaced in these other jurisdictions. The
language of the Georgia statute, prohibiting fraudulent transfers as well as
gifts by insolvent debtors,' has been interpreted in a confusing fashion in
some cases.2 The South Carolina statute has been criticized for retaining
CIV. CODE ANN. arts. 2036,2038 (West 1987); see also infra note 125 (discussing
Louisiana law).
17 SeeAIJASKASTAT. § 34.40.100 (Michie 1986); GA. CODEANN. § 18-2-22(2)
(1991); MISS. CODE ANN. § 15-3-5 (1995); S.C. CODE ANN. § 27-23-40 (Law. Co-
op. 1991); VA. CODE ANN. § 55-80 (Michie 1995). In Kansas, the same result
obtains by judicial decision. See, e.g., Gorham State Bank v. Sellens, 772 P.2d 793,
797 (Kan. 1989) ("[T]he rights of innocent third parties such as bona fide
purchasers for value, without notice or knowledge of any fraud, are fully protected
under our decisions.. . ."); City of Arkansas City v. Anderson, 804 P.2d 1026,
1031 (Kan. Ct. App. 1991) ("[A] bona fide purchaser for value will obtain good
title, notwithstanding an earlier fraudulent transfer... ."). In Louisiana, the transfer
can be avoided even from a purchaser for value and without knowledge, but "in
that case that person is entitled to recover as much as he gave." LA. CIV. CODE
ANN. art. 2038 (West 1987).
118 See GA. CODE ANN. § 18-2-22(3) (1991); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2039
(West 1987); MISS. CODEANN. § 15-3-3 (1995) (no insolvency requirement); VA.
CODE ANN. § 55-81 (Michie 1995).
19 Compare KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 378.040 with ALASKA STAT. § 9.25.060
(Michie 1996); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 33-103 (1993); MISS. CODE ANN. § 15-3-3
(1995) (both real and personal property covered, but only if transfers made without
consideration); and S.C. CODE ANN. § 27-23-70 (Law. Co-op. 1991) (gifts of
personal property made without change of possession). The Alaska and Kansas
statutes except, as does the Kentucky statute, retention of possession of personal
property in accordance with § 2-402(2) of the Uniform Commercial Code.
120 Compare KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 378.050 with KAN. STAT. ANN. § 33-104
(1993) (five years); MISS. CODEANN. § 15-3-3 (1995) (three years); andVA. CODE
ANN. § 55-87 (Michie 1995) (five years).
121 See GA. CODE ANN. § 18-2-22(2) (1991) (fraudulent transfers); id. § 18-2-
22(3) (transfers without consideration by insolvents).
'22 See Developments in Georgia Law: Debtor-Creditor Rights, 12 GA. L. REV.
814, 1026, 1034 (1978).
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the inefficient requirement of an unsatisfied levy or execution.'1 In
Virginia, the Statute-of-Elizabeth language was used to reach a preference
paid by a corporation to an insider, with resulting confusion between
preference and fraudulent conveyance law. 'I Revisions to Louisiana law
in 1984 are more in keeping with the uniform acts. 2 '
Reform efforts have continued. The UFTA was introduced (but not
passed) in 1997 inKansas andMississippi. 126 Several formerly non-uniform
states have recently adopted the UFTA, 2 7 and their reports indicate that
adoption continues to be based on the advantages of the uniform acts that
have inhered since their first writing.' North Carolina, which adopted the
UFTA in 1997,129 previously had a Statute-of-Elizabeth-type law that "was
'23 See Samuel L. Wilkins, Annual Survey ofSouth Carolina Law: Property, 34
S.C. L. REV. 193, 198-99 (1982). The same problem may exist, at least as to
personal property, in Kentucky; see supra note 59.
24 See Joseph E. Ulrich, Fraudulent Conveyances and Preferences in Virginia,
36 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 51 (1979) (discussing Bank of Commerce v. Rosemary
& Thyme, Inc., 239 S.E.2d 909 (Va. 1978) and Darden v. George G. Lee Co., 129
S.E.2d 897 (Va. 1963)). Professor Ulrich's criticism is that the confusion generated
by the Virginia Supreme Court in these two cases might have been avoided under
the UFTA, which provides for a separate avenue of recovery for preferences to
insiders wholly apart from the fraudulent transfer actions in the rest of the act. See
UFTA § 5(b), 7A U.L.A. 657-58 (1985).
121 See LA. Civ. CODE art. 2036 (West 1987). This statute calls the revocatory
action, "the civil law analogue to the common law suit to set aside a fraudulent
conveyance." Id. cmt. (c). See also Benjamin M. Goodman, Comment, The
Revocatory Action, 9 TiJL. L. REv. 422,422 (1934-35) ("The basic requirement of
a successful revocatory action is fraud on the part of the debtor."). However, the
Louisiana statute as enacted in 1984 by its terms abandons any notion of fraud,
stating simply, "An obligee has a right to annul an act of the obligor ... that causes
or increases the obligor's insolvency." LA. CIV. CODE art. 2036 (West 1987). See
also id. cmt. (a) (stating that this provision "changes the law insofar as it abandons
the notion of fraud"); see generally Schewe, supra note 8, at 39-44. Thus, the
Louisiana statute allows recovery for constructively fraudulent transfers in a
fashion similar to the UFTA.
126 Telephone Interview with John McCabe, supra note 115.
127 States recently adopting the UFTA without having previously adopted the
UFCA are Missouri (1992), Indiana (1994), Iowa (1994), Vermont (1996), and
North Carolina (1997). Other Kentucky neighbors did the same but not as recently:
Illinois (1989) and West Virginia (1986). See 7A U.L.A. 427 (1985) & 217 (Supp.
1997) (tables of adoptions of UFCA and UFTA).
128 See supra notes 21-24 and accompanying text.
129 See supra note 19.
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written in archaic language and was difficult to interpret."'3 An earlier
review of North Carolina law urged adoption of the UFCA, noting that it
would "substitute clear, relatively simple statutory provisions for the
complex, confusing and sometimes strained interpretations of the present
North Carolina statutes." 3' Indiana, which adopted the UFTA in 1994,132
previously had statutory and common law that "put in doubt the role of
insolvency in finding a fraudulent transfer" and "[made] it perilous for
Indiana attorneys to counsel clients on the possible effect of such common-
place transactions as foreclosures and leveragedbuyouts."'3 3 Illinois, which
adopted the UFTA in 1989,134 previously had difficulty reconciling the
provisions on fraudulent transfers with those on gifts by insolvent debtors.
Reviewers there noted that, under the old non-uniform law,
[a] reading of... cases does not allay confusion. Courts concluding that
the debtor's intent was fraudulent could have just as easily concluded that
his intent was innocent. The statutory language does not provide any
guidelines so that a debtor and creditor can determine whether a proposed
payment will survive judicial scrutiny.
35
Similarly, when the UFTA was adopted in Missouri in 1992, one practitio-
ner noted that "[c]reditors in Missouri will no longer be forced to accept the
inadequacies of archaic and outdated fraudulent conveyance provisions.'
3 6
2. Preferences
The other states with a general anti-preference law like Kentucky's are
New Mexico and Ohio. 37 In New Mexico, aside from an early case
'30Commentary by The North Carolina Bar Ass'n 1 (1997) (copy on file with
author).
132 E. Cader Howard, Comment, The Law ofFraudulent Conveyances in North
Carolina: An Analysis and Comparison with the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyances
Act, 50 N.C. L. REV. 873, 902 (1972).
132 See 7A U.L.A. 217 (Supp. 1997) (table of adoption of UFTA).
133 Report of the Debtor-Creditor Committee of the Indiana State Bar Asso-
ciation Reporting on and Recommending Adoption of the Indiana Uniform
Fraudulent TransferAct, 28 IND. L. REV. 1197, 1202 (1995) [hereinafter Indiana
State Bar Ass'n Report].
134 See supra note 132.
3 Darrell Dunham & Paul Antonacci, An Analysis ofFraudulent Preferences
Under Illinois Fraudulent Conveyances Law, 12 S. ILL. U. L.J. 89, 115 (1987).
136Francis X. Buckley, Jr., The Missouri Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, 50
J. Mo. B. 89, 93 (1994).
137 See supra notes 36-38 and accompanying text.
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interpreting the statute carefully and literally,"' reported decisions show
that courts or counsel have apparently ignored or overlooked it. In one case,
the court held that, despite the statute's language, there is a right of a debtor
to prefer one creditor over others. 3 9 And in two other cases, the court noted
that the statute had been overlooked by the parties. 4
In Ohio, the confusion between fraudulent transfers and preferences
has reachedthe statutory level. One section of the statute permits avoidance
both of preferences and fraudulent transfers,'14 and a second section, added
later, provides that there is no avoidance unless the transferee "knew of
such fraudulent intent on the part of such debtor."'42 This language could
be read to mean that fraudulent intent is required in preference actions.
Although the Ohio Supreme Court resolved this question in a "reasonable
but textually strained" fashion, limiting "fraudulent intent" to mean "intent
to prefer" when a preference was in fact involved, 43 later opinions continue
138 In Early Times Distillery Co. v. Zeiger, 49 P. 723 (N.M. 1897), the court
held that a preference in violation of the statute operates as an assignment in trust,
so that any other creditor may proceed to make and prove a claim before the court
of equity, which has jurisdiction instantly upon the making of the preference. Id.
at 725.
'39 See Marchbanks v. McCullough, 132 P.2d 426,429 (N.M. 1942) ("[T]here
is no law which prevents a preference of one creditor over another ... if the
transfer is not in fact made with the intent and purpose of hindering, delaying or
defrauding any creditor; notwithstanding the transferer may be insolvent."
(citations omitted)).
1
40 See Smith v. Cox, 831 P.2d 981,983 n.1 (N.M. 1992) ("While we recognize
that... [the anti-preference statute] specifically addresses questions of preferential
transfers, we have omitted any discussion of this statute because the parties failed
to raise it at any time.... ."); Field v. Otero, 255 P. 785,786 (N.M. 1927) ("[A]side
from the restrictions of the Bankruptcy Law, or local insolvency laws, neither of
which has been invoked in this case, there is no law which prevents a preference
of one creditor over another."). I am indebted to Professor Fred Hart for citing me
to the Otero case.
141 See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1313.56 (Anderson 1993).
142 Id. § 1313.57. Although the recognizable predecessor of § 1313.56 dates
from 1859, the predecessor to § 1313.57 was passed in 1902. See Buckley, supra
note 39, at 871-76.
14' Buckley, supra note 39, at 887-88 (discussing Carruthers v. Kennedy, 166
N.E. 801 (Ohio 1929)). Although the statutory language is clear, the court in
Carruthers noted that:
a larger degree of moral turpitude is involved in a transaction with intent to
hinder, delay, and defraud creditors than is involved in a transaction with
a design to prefer one or more creditors to the exclusion of others, and we
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to show that the confusion spawned by these statutes lives on.'" The Ohio
anti-preference statute is useful primarily in bankruptcy cases because it
provides a longer"reach-bacek" period than the federal statute. 45 Unlike the
Kentucky and New Mexico statutes, the Ohio statute apparently allows a
creditor to avoid a preference outside of a collective proceeding for the
benefit of all creditors." That is of little use, however, because such a
recovery would simply be another preference avoidable by another creditor
in a perhaps endless chain of such actions.
47
m. EVALUATION OF KENTUCKY LAW IN
COMPARISON TO THE EVOLVING NATIONAL STANDARDS
Given this background of the development of fraudulent transfer and
preference laws, this Part evaluates Kentucky's laws in light of the
experiences of other states. Again, the fraudulent transfer and preference
laws are separated for individual discussion, followed by an analysis of the
impact of reform on lawyers' ethical obligations.
A. Fraudulent Transfers
It is apparent that the Kentucky fraudulent transfer law offers few if
any advantages when compared with the UFTA. The UFTA and its
predecessor both are recognized as codifying the "better decisions" under
the Statute of Elizabeth. 48 In addition, both the UFCA and UFTA provided
recovery for creditors for transfers constructively fraudulent; that is,
can see no possible reason why the Legislature should protect one and fail
to protect the other.
Carruthers, 166 N.E. at 803.
' See, e.g., Toledo Trust Co. v. Foxhall Partners, No. L-89-036, 1990 WL
7974, at *6 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 2, 1990) (holding that, in a case involving only a
preferential transfer, "the requirements of [§] 1313.57 would still not be met, as
there is no evidence showing that the appellee knew of any fraudulent intent" on
the part of the debtor).
'45 See Buckley, supra note 39, at 894.
1
46 See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1313.56 (Anderson 1993) ("In a suit brought
by a creditor.., for the purpose of declaring such a sale void, a receiver may be
appointed... ." (Emphasis added)). This was read to permit a plenary lawsuit for
the recovery of money paid as a preference in Malone v. Summer & Co., 244
N.E.2d 485, 488 (Ohio Ct. App. 1968).
141 See 2 GLENN, supra note 7, at 651; Buckley, supra note 39, at 895 & n. 103.
'41 UFTA, 7A U.L.A. 639 (1985) (Prefatory Note).
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transfers by debtors for inadequate consideration that left the debtors
thereby insolvent or nearly so. Both these are recognized by virtually all
commentators as vast improvements over the preexisting common law.149
The unusual Kentucky provision avoiding gifts without regard to insol-
vency 50 would not be duplicated under the UFTA, but that statute has been
long-recognized as a relic without modem purpose.' The UFTA has the
additional advantage of renewed harmony with federal bankruptcy law.'
There is little reason to have different rules under state law,' apparently
apart from a longer limitation period.
To be sure, the UFTA is not without its critics. The most significant
overall criticism of the UFTA is that it reaches too broadly and is ineffec-
tive where it tries to be specific. The problem with drafting fraudulent
conveyance law in general is that the language can suffer from being at
once too general and too specific, allowing escape from the desired result,
since fraud, whether actual or deemed, takes so many forms.
A statutory proscription of particular transactions or of transactions with
particular consequences must offer a catalog of indicia to signal reliably
those transfers that invidiously sacrifice some interests in favor of others.
The laws must hold the "dirty guys" in without unduly inhibiting the
regularity and predictability of commercial transactions. Achieving the
best balance of general and specific terminology to assure commercially
reasonable results is a significant challenge.
54
In addition, fraudulent conveyance law that strays too far from the ordinary
cases leads to inefficiency because creditors can always add terms to their
149 See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
0 See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 378.020 (Michie 1972).
15 See Marks, supra note 81, at 459 (advocating enactment of the UFCA to
"remove the stigma of a doctrine early placed in Kentucky's laws by the blind
following of [New York precedent] and which rests on no more than the highly
dubious rationale 'that a person must be just before he is generous"').
'52 This was one of the reasons for the UFTA. See UFTA, 7A U.L.A. 639
(1985) (Prefatory Note); Kennedy, supra note 9, at 198-99.
... This was recognized with the promulgation of the UFCA in 1918:
Business at the present time largely disregards state lines, and it is important
for a creditor in giving credit to know, what degree he can rely on the
property of his debtor, though it is situated in another state. The Bankruptcy
Act... strongly emphasizes the desirability of this, which even apart from
that Act would be important.
UFCA, 7A U.L.A. 427 (1985) (Prefatory Note).
154 Alces & Dorr, supra note 8, at 549.
[VOL. 86
1997-98] FRAUDULENT TRANSFER AND PREFERENCE LAWS
contract individually, but it would require the collective consent of all of
them to opt out of a statutory provision. Thus, going beyond the obvious
"shams" and gifts by insolvent debtors may create more problems than it
solves. 55
The main specific criticisms of the UFTA focus on the timing of a
transfer'56 and definitions of terms, "insolvency" in particular.157 A second
point of contention is the avoidance of an insider preference under UFTA
§ 5(b)."I This is the only provision of the UFTA permitting avoidance of
a transfer without any requirement of a lack of a reasonably equivalent
value received in exchange or of an intent to defraud. 159 Not only does this
language again vacillate between the general and the precise,160 it makes the
choice to risk catching "good-faith" insiders, assuming that such trans-
ferees will be few and far between.161 Many states have differed with the
"I See Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H. Jackson, Fraudulent Conveyance Law
and Its Proper Domain, 38 VAND. L. REv. 829, 836-40 (1985). The argument of
Professors Baird and Jackson is, of course, directed at fraudulent transfer law
generally, and loses some force when discussing state law in the shadow of 11
U.S.C. § 548, which already ventures far down the path that Baird and Jackson
suggest should be tread lightly.
156 See Paul M. Shupack, Confision in Policy and Language in the Uniform
Fraudulent TransferAct, 9 CARDOzO L. REv. 811, 820-23 (1987).
117 See id. at 823-35; Alces & Dorr, supra note 8, at 558-63 (discussing the
difficulty with using insolvency as a measuring criterion at all in cases of upstream
or cross-stream guarantees and leveraged buyouts); Barry L. Zaretsky, Fraudulent
Transfer Law as the Arbiter of Unreasonable Risk, 46 S.C. L. REV. 1165, 1177-99
(1995) (suggesting the use of "unreasonable risk" analysis in such cases).
' That subsection provides:
A transfer made by a debtor is fraudulent as to a creditor whose claim arose
before the transfer was made if the transfer was made to an insider for an
antecedent debt, the debtor was insolvent at that time, and the insider had
reasonable cause to believe that the debtor was insolvent.
UFTA, 7A U.L.A. 657 (1985).
.59 All transfers deemed fraudulentby §§ 4(a)(2) and 5(a) require that the debtor
did not receive reasonably equivalent value in exchange. The only other transfers
avoidable by the Act are those made under § 4(a)(1) "with actual intent to hinder,
delay, or defraud." Id. § 4(a)(1).
"6 The term "insider" is defined in § 1(7) in great detail, but only with
examples, and the entire insider preference avoidance depends on the insider's
"reasonable cause to believe" in the debtor's solvency or insolvency. Id. § 5(b); see
generally Alces & Dorr, supra note 8, at 551-57.
161 See Michael L. Cook & Richard E. Mendales, The Uniform Fraudulent
Transfer Act: An Introductory Critique, 62 AM. BANKR. L.J. 87, 88-89 (1988).
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NCCUSL on this point; two have reinstated the requirement of a lack of
reasonably equivalent value, 6 2 and four have omitted the subsection
altogether. 63 The report of the Indiana Bar Association on the UFTA
provides well-reasoned arguments for omitting this provision,"6 and should
be seriously considered in any Kentucky study of the UFTA, especially if
Kentucky's general anti-preference law is also recommended to be
repealed.
Uniformity for its own sake is not necessarily a good thing, and before
the UFTA is embraced as a solution, it should be considered whether other
non-uniform modifications to fraudulent transfer laws would be an even
better improvement. However, even critics of the NCCUSL recognize that
uniformity in commercial laws, such as the UFTA, can be advantageous.'65
Overall, the UFTA obviously is not a perfect statute, but it provides
certainty anduniformity, both of which are advantageous in creditor-debtor
law. And even if the UFTA is not perfect, few would likely rise to defend
the existing Kentucky law. The statute has not been carefully examined in
a hundred years, if ever. The interpretive decisions are likewise old, and
typically arise in noncommercial settings that are of little help to the
modem commercial practitioner. Although the UFTA has been criticized
for imperfectly responding to modem transactions such as intercorporate
guarantees and leveraged buyouts,166 it is difficult to fathom how a court
would begin such an analysis independently with only the guidance of
Kentucky's antique laws.
Perhaps no change has been made because there has been very little
reason to do so, considering the costs of organizing and procuring a change
in the laws. However, by adopting the UFTA, there would be very little
work to do. The statute has been accepted after careful study in many
states. 167 This is not to suggest that further study should not be done before
162 See UFTA § 5, 7A U.L.A. 247 (Supp. 1997) (Hawaii and Oregon).
163 See id. (Arizona, California, Indiana, and Pennsylvania).
'6 See Indiana State Bar Ass'n Report, supra note 133, at 1205-07.
161 See Larry E. Ribstein & Bruce H. Kobayashi, An Economic Analysis of
Uniform State Laws, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 131, 150 (1996); see also supra note 152
(discussing reasons for uniformity offered by the NCCUSL when the UFCA was
promulgated).
66 See supra note 157.
'
6" See Nathaniel Hansford, Fraudulent Conveyances: Alabama Common Law
vs. the Uniform Fraudulent Transfers Act - An Opening Discussion, 16 CUMB. L.
REV. 1 (1985); Indiana State Bar Ass'n Report, supra note 133; Commentary by
The North Carolina Bar Ass'n, supra note 130.
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the UFTA is considered for adoption in Kentucky. In particular, Kentucky
should carefully consider whether the UFTA reaches too broadly.' 68 But
even before that study is done, we already have a fairly good idea of what
the broad outlines of the result should be.
Recent federal legislation supplied the incentive for meaningful reform
missing in the day-to-day work of the collections lawyer, but the opportu-
nity yielded unhelpful results. Federal welfare reform legislation passed in
1996169 requires that states have plans for enforcement of child and spousal
support orders in order to receive "Family Assistance Grants,"'7 ° which
replace payments under Aid to Families with Dependent Children.' 7 1 One
required element of a state plan is adoption of the UFCA or UFTA or
"another law, specifying indicia of fraud which create a prima facie case
that a debtor transferred income or property to avoid payment to a child
support creditor, which the Secretary finds affords comparable rights to
child support creditors."' 72 Kentucky responded not by adopting one of the
uniform acts as suggested by the federal law, but with enabling legislation
allowing "indicia of fraud" to be set forth in regulations of the Cabinet for
Families and Children.'" While the language is inartful at best, 174 it is
apparently adequate for purposes of the federal legislation requiring an
168 See, e.g., Alces & Dorr, supra note 8; Baird & Jackson, supra note 155;
Zaretsky, supra note 157, at 1165 n.3.
169 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996,
Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 42 U.S.C.). I am indebted to Jerry Hartzell of the North Carolina bar for
citing me to this Act.
170 Id. § 103(a)(1), 110 Stat. at 2113-16 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 601).
17, See id. § 116(b)(1)(C)(ii), 110 Stat. at 2183 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 601).
172 Id. § 364, 110 Stat. at 2249 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 666(g)). This type of
state law is required of an effective state plan pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 654(20)(A).
173 See H.B. 161, § 24, 98 Reg. Sess. (Ky. 1998), which added the following
language to section 405.060(2) of the Kentucky Revised Statutes:
In any case where an obligor transfers income or property to avoid payment
to a child support creditor, the transfer shall be indicia of fraud. Indicia of
fraud creates a prima facie case that the transfer of income or property was
to avoid payment of child support. Indicia of fraud shall be set forth by
administrative regulation.
This bill was signed by the Governor on April 2, 1998. See the unofficial
legislative history at HB/161 (visited Apr. 7, 1998) <http://www.lrc.state.ky.us/
record/ 98rs/HB 161.htm>.
74The transfer itself cannot actually be considered an indicator of fraud, as the
statutory language quoted in the preceding note suggests.
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effective state plan. 171 It does nothing to assist the ordinary commercial
cases, because the right to avoid the transfer extends only to the wife and
child who were defrauded or whose rights were hindered.
176
B. Preferences
The Kentucky anti-preference law is even more peculiar. Such statutes
were always in the minority, with the widely accepted "black letter" rule
being that a debtor has a right to pay a creditor at any time, regardless of
the effect on other creditors. 177 Most states have anti-preference statutes
that apply inthe context of general or special collective proceedings for the
benefit of creditors, but that is exactly where one would expect such a rule.
In that instance, the race of the diligent has been suspended, and such
diligence should no longer be rewarded.
It is possible that Kentucky's anti-preference statute was meant
originally to be such a statute, to provide a method for an "involuntary"
assignment for the benefit of creditors, much like involuntary bankruptcy,
which was the only type of bankruptcy known at the time the Kentucky law
was passed.'78 This argument, however, seems inconsistent with Ken-
tucky's later general assignment law, 179 which provides for an explicit
involuntary action upon petition of creditors.18 The ability to set aside pre-
"' Telephone Interview with Pat Patterson, Kentucky Cabinet for Families and
Children (Apr. 1, 1998).
176 See H.B. 161, § 24, 98 Reg. Sess. (Ky. 1998) (amending KY. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 405.060 (1994)).
177 [F]ew states have statutes similar to our one as embodied in... [KY.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 378.060] et seq., and prior to their enactment in
jurisdictions adopting them, and in all otherjurisdictions not adopting them,
it was and is lawful for a debtor to prefer his creditor, and it was only for
the providing for a pro rata benefit to be reaped by all of his creditors that
such statutes were enacted.
Tipton's Adm'x v. Ball, 77 S.W.2d 50, 52 (Ky. 1934); accord Fawcett's Assignee
v. Mitchell, Finch & Co., 117 S.W. 956, 958 (Ky. 1909) ("Except for our statute,
there is nothing illegal in the act of preferring one creditor over another.").
"' There was a brief experiment with voluntary bankruptcy in the Bankruptcy
Act of 1841, but it quickly proved unpopular and was repealed 18 months later. See
RIESENFELD, supra note 29, at 457.
179 See 1894 Ky. Acts ch. 83 (codified as amended at KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§
379.010-.170 (Michie 1972 & Supp. 1996)).
'
0 See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 379.170 (Michie Supp. 1996).
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assignment transfers is provided there, as the assignee may use in that case
"any remedy which a creditor might exercise," '81 and courts have held these
provisions complementary and not inconsistent. 8 2 Since the general
assignment statute is more recent" 3 and provides detailed rules for
administration of the estate, it seems peculiar at best to retain an earlier
statute dictating, as the anti-preference statute does, that the preference
shall operate as such an involuntary assignment, to be administered as a
decedent's estate would be.1
8 4
In any event, these statutes are of little importance except in the few
situations where relief under the Code is not possible or practical. It is
highly unlikely that a preference would be set aside as an assignment for
the benefit of creditors or even in a general assignment today. If followed
literally, the anti-preference law's assignment of the preference for the
benefit of all creditors could be considered grounds for involuntary
bankruptcy under Code § 303(h)(2), 185 if the requisite number and type of
creditors join in such a petition.'86 The deemed general assignment would
also elevate federal claims under the federal priority statute.8 7 In any event,
'8 Id. § 379.070 (Michie 1972).
'
82 See Tipton's Adm'x v. Ball, 77 S.W.2d 50,51 (Ky. 1934); Hall's Assignees
v. Rothchild, 44 S.W. 108 (Ky. 1898).
18 The general assignment law was passed in 1894. See supra note 179. The
anti-preference statute was passed in 1856. See supra note 84 and accompanying
text.
'84 See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 378.070 ("The action... shall be conducted as
are actions and proceedings for the settlement of the estates of deceased persons,
insofar as they are applicable.").
Of course, if the anti-preference statute is repealed, the ability to recover
preferences before a general assignment must be explicitly added to the general
assignment law, because the existing statute, section 370.070, merely gives the
assignee "any remedy which a creditor might exercise." Id. § 379.070.
18' This section provides that the court shall order relief on an involuntary
petition, even if controverted by the debtor, if, within four months of the.petition,
"a custodian, other than a trustee, receiver, or agent appointed or authorized to take
charge of less than substantially all of the property of the debtor for the purpose of
enforcing a lien against such property, was appointed or took possession." 11
U.S.C. § 303(h)(2) (1994). The anti-preference law provides for a general receiver,
see KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 378.080(1).
"6 See 11 U.S.C. § 303(b).
'17 See 31 U.S.C. § 3713(a)(1)(A) (1994). The assignment made by the
Kentucky statute would probably not be a "voluntary" assignment under subsection
(i), but is likely an "act of bankruptcy" under subsection (iii). See supra notes 32-
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a debtor faced with any such proceeding would likely then seek refuge in
a bankruptcy proceeding, if for no other reason than to obtain the discharge
there provided. 88
The main use of the Kentucky anti-preference law seems to be under
Code § 544(b), to allow a trustee in bankruptcy to reach preferences within
six months of filing, rather than the three months provided for non-insider
preferences under Code § 547. In addition, because of the extraordinary
remedy provided - forcing essentially a general assignment - the statute
provides strong bargaining ammunition outside of bankruptcy for any
remaining creditor to use against a debtor who has made such a preference.
This second use, however, is not one that should necessarily be respected
in any policy analysis. Creditors have the legitimate threat of forcing a
general assignment under state law or the Code, but only upon the
prerequisites there provided."8 9 The assignment provided by the Kentucky
anti-preference statute seems more an antiquated relic than a conscious
decision to allow Kentucky creditors an unusual if little-used remedy.
Although this relic was incorporated in the state's general assignment
statute, apparently little thought was given to the coexistence of these two
remedies. This anomaly does not exist in New Mexico and Ohio. Both
states retained a general anti-preference statute while adopting the UFTA,
which of course contains no such provision. 9 '
There should be no place for an ability to avoid a preference outside of
any collective proceeding. In theory, the entire idea of a "preference"
originated with a payment in the shadow of an insolvency liquidation.' 9'
The lack of any collective proceeding eliminates the need for any
individual recovery, because no creditor has actually been harmed by the
preference unless that creditor has been unable to collect. Individual
35 and accompanying text.
"' See 11 U.S.C. § 524 (discharge of debts). "The lack of discharge limits the
usefulness of an [assignment for the benefit of creditors] for any debtor who can
consider a bankruptcy alternative." ELIZABETH WARREN & JAY LAWRENCE
WESTBROOK, THE LAW OF DEBTORS AND CREDITORS 192 (3d ed. 1996).
'89 See KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 379.170(1) (Michie Supp. 1996) (providing for
action brought by creditor or creditors representing one-fourth of the liabilities);
11 U.S.C. § 303(b) (setting out the requirement for type and number of creditors
bringing an involuntary bankruptcy petition).
190 See supra text accompanying notes 137-47 (discussing New Mexico and
Ohio experiences).
91 See 2 GLENN, supra note 7, at 652 ("[A] wrong has been done, provided the
debtor's estate is put into fair liquidation."); Countryman, supra note 52, at714-15.
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recovery of a preference is inconsistent with state law, which normally
rewards the diligent creditor. 92 And in practice, such an action would be
impractical; if such a creditor were able to recover the preference and levy
upon it as if it were a fraudulent transfer, the effect would simply be to
substitute one preference for another. 93
C. Clarification ofProfessional Responsibility
Modernization of Kentucky fraudulent transfer andpreference law may
help lawyers with some difficult ethical problems. The Kentucky Rules of
Professional Conduct ("Rules") prohibit a lawyer from counseling clients
to engage or assist in conduct "that the lawyer knows is criminal or
fraudulent."' 94 This rule probably creates more uncertainty among
practitioners than it should, because fraud, as defined in the Rules, "denotes
conduct having apurpose to deceive."'195 Presumably this definition excepts
conduct without a deceitful purpose which is nonetheless "deemed
fraudulent" under state law. 96
However, any uncertainty removed by this definition of fraud is
reintroduced by the Rule proscribing conduct by a lawyer "involving
192 State law puts a premium on prompt action by creditors: the first creditor
to attach the debtor's property, the first creditor to execute on the property,
etc. is the one most likely to be paid. Bankruptcy law, on the other hand,
emphasizes equality of treatment, rather than a race of diligence.
1 DAVID G. EPSTEIN ET AL., BANKRUPTCY § 1-3(b), at 7 (1992). See also
Countryman, supra note 52, at 715 (stating that preferences should be proscribed
"[o]nly when the legal system provides, as an alternative to the creditors' unilateral
grab-law system, a procedure for collective administration").
3 See supra note 147 and accompanying text.
19 4 KY. SUP. CT. RULE 3.130 (RULE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.2(d)).
I95 d. (Terminology [4]).
196 Compare UFTA § 4(a)(1) (transfers avoidable if made with 'actual intent to
hinder, delay or defraud") with id. §§ 4(b) & 5(a) (transfers avoidable under some
circumstances if made without receiving reasonably equivalent value). Although
one of the motivations of the NCCUSL in adopting the UFTA was to provide
certainty to counsel in light of then newly adopted Model Rules of Professional
Conduct, see Kennedy, supra note 9, at 199, in this one respect, it may cause
confusion because it refers to the latter transactions as "fraudulent" where older
statutes merely made them avoidable without giving them the additional label of
"fraudulent," see, e.g., KY. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 378.020 (gifts by debtors void, but
not called "fraudulent"), 378.060 (performance operates as a general assignment,
but not called "fraudulent").
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dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation."' 97 It is likely that this rule
is intended to reach more broadly to conduct that might not be actionable
as a fraudulent transfer.9 ' Furthermore, the intent required as an element
of a violation of this rule is open to question.'99 And in any event, "the
extent of a lawyer's obligation is seriously complicated by the requirement
to protect client information.... The problem is obviously one that cries
out for clarification .... 2 00 When these problems inherent in the Rules
themselves are combined with the anti-preference statute, it is difficult to
see any clear answer. In the presence of pleadings and court opinions
commingling "fraud" with the anti-preference statute,20' what lawyer could
be sure that advice to an insolvent creditor to pay any debts is not
professional misconduct? Enactment of a sensible fraudulent transfer law
would be a long first step toward separating advice on a client's ordinary
commercial conduct from unethical behavior.
CONCLUSION
Sometimes an antique is an honored, well-worn standard that has
endured because of its superior quality and workmanship. Sometimes it is
simply junk that no one has bothered to throw out or replace because it
hasn't been in the way very much. I submit that Kentucky's fraudulent
transfer and preferences laws are more the latter than the former. The
197 KY. Sup. CT. RULE 3.130 (RULE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 8.3(c)).
'98 See In re Kenyon, 491 S.E.2d 252,254 (S.D. 1997) ("We do not have to find
fraudulent conveyances - only fraudulent or dishonest conduct.").
'" CompareIn re Taylor, 878 P.2d 1103, 1106 (Or. 1994) ("[T]he accusedmust
act with the intent to cheat creditors to violate that rule.") with In re Hockett, 734
P.2d 877, 883 (Or. 1998) ("[A] client's conveyance of property to avoid lawful
claims of creditors would be conduct in violation of [this rule], which 'simply
stated, requires honesty."' (quoting In re Sedor, 245 N.W.2d 895, 901 (Wis.
1976)).
200 CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS 722, 725 (1986).
201 See, e.g., W.R. Willett Lumber Co. v. Hall, 375 S.W.2d 266,267 (Ky. 1964)
(difficulty in determining nature of claim due primarily to poorly drafted
complaint); Stephens v. Allied Bldg. Credits, Inc., 265 S.W.2d 60, 61 (Ky. 1954)
(same); Kincaid v. Brown's Estate, 262 S.W.2d 468,474 (Ky. 1953) (preference
pled as a voidable transfer); Lyon v. Harris, 121 S.W.2d 696, 697 (Ky. 1938) (case
dismissed for failure to show fraud, even though transfer would be actionable under
anti-preference statute); Farmers' Bank & Trust Co. v. Peters, 11 S.W.2d 103, 105
(Ky. 1928) (same).
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ancient language is difficult for lawyers and courts to decipher, and has the
additional cost to society of lack of respect for laws that cannot possibly
mean what they say. Granted, the costs are not highly visible in the case of
these statutes, because they appear in court relatively rarely. They are,
however, frequently in the background in planning and negotiating
commercial transactions. The costs of removing these uncertainties need
not be high, because a well-received uniform act already exists and, after
suitable study, can probably be put to good use. In that way, costs for
everyone can be reduced, and Kentucky law in this area could, for the first
time in over a century, say what it means.
I
